The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in Specifically, it presents profiles of all for-profit corporations founded in the Russian Empire except in the Grand Duchy of Finland from the time of Peter the Great to the eve of World War I.
RUSCORP describes the initial state of these companies at the time of their incorporation as well as their condition in , , , , , and Major items covered by the data include the amount of basic capital, the number and price of shares, the location of headquarters and main operations, industrial classifications of major economic functions, the citizenship, ethnicity, sex, and social status of founders and managers, and tsarist restrictions regarding the ethnicity or citizenship of stockholders, management, and other key employees.
The database also contains profiles of all foreign corporations operating in the Russian Empire in Entrepreneurship in the Russian Empire, Book 3 editions published in in English and held by 6 WorldCat member libraries worldwide.
- Software Pipelines and SOA: Releasing the Power of Multi-Core Processing (Addison-Wesley Information Technology Series).
- Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines.
- The Physiological Basis of Veterinary Clinical Pharmacology.
Vospominaniya o vedennom [i. The social and ideological evolution of the Moscow merchants, by Thomas C Owen Book 2 editions published in in English and held by 3 WorldCat member libraries worldwide. Vospominaniya o vedennom, slyshannom i ispytannom by N. Tsarist economic policy and the commercial-industrial elite, by L. E Shepelev Book 2 editions published in in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide. The cooperation under Russian law, : a study in tsarist economic policy by Thomas C Owen Book 1 edition published in in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide.
Tsarist economic policy and the commercial-industrial elite, by Leonid E Shepelev 1 edition published in in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide. Audience Level. Related Identities. Associated Subjects. English Japanese 3 Russian 2. Author , Editor , Other. Narrative of a tour of the Soviet Union by an interracial delegation of American intellectuals and business leaders. The author, a graduate of Dickinson College where he was the only African-American student at the time , was a long-time editor Moskva: Quarto Some minor chipping and a few short closed tears to jacket extremities, else Very Good and sound.
Catalog of the works of the Russian avant-garde painter. Staple-bound pamphlet; original printed wrappers; 71pp. Mild soil to cover margins; internally fine. Scarce; OCLC locates only 5 copies. Octavo More about U. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union. New York: International Publishers, Shallow dampstaining at bottom textblock edge slightly bleeding into text, else Very Good and sound. More about Education in Soviet Russia. New York: Social Science Publishers, .
Some wear from handling, top extremities a bit darkened, bottom extremities slightly faded, small dampstain to upper cover, else About Very Good. Moscow: Detgiz, Reissue of Nekrasov's classic 19th century tale-in-verse of a dancing bear and his drunken handler. Nicely illustrated on each page by A.
Dilemmas of Russian Capitalism: Fedor Chizhov and Corporate Enterprise in the Railroad Age
Text entirely in Russian. Staple-bound pamphlet. Pictorial wrappers softcover ; 16p; illus.
Near Fine. More about General Toptygin. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, Extremities a bit rubbed, especially spine ends, faint bookseller rubberstamp to p. New York: St. Martin's Press, London: Novosti Press Agency, Pictorial thick paper wrappers; 55pp. Mild external wear; internally clean and unmarked. Very Good. Very early account of Russia's third-largest international university, founded in and renamed for Patrice Lumumba following Congolese independence in More about Two Universities.
The dangers were not just local. The risk of a nuclear Armageddon kept growing. Nobody wanted that, but no one was able to vow it would not happen. By , the year Brezhnev died, the aggregate yield of Soviet and U. That alone made perestroika an absolute must. In order to avoid disaster, a new type of relationship had to be negotiated with the United States.
Before Gorbachev not a single politician had dared make peace with a class enemy. The problem of preventing a nuclear war had been addressed by building up weapons stockpiles in order to prevent a situation where one country would possess more weapons than the other. I can anticipate the question: If perestroika was so critical for the country, why then did it end in failure, loss of power by its leader, and the breakup of the Soviet Union?
By , thanks to its previous leaders, from Stalin to Chernenko, the Soviet Union had been brought to such a state that its rescue would have required tremendous efforts by the entire ruling class. But the country was split along confrontational lines between rival factions, from orthodox conservatives to ultra radicals. For most of them the chief motif was certainly not preserving the Soviet Union, let alone reforming it into a democracy. Although many of these gains were later uprooted like what had happened on many occasions before.
But just as in the previous brighter years of Russian history, some gains became deeply ingrained in political culture. It is from these strongholds that the way will be paved towards a Russia of honest people that Dostoevsky had dreamed of in his day. Historical experience indicates this is inevitable.
It only remains to be seen when this will happen. That policy was in stark contrast to the one pursued from Stalin to Brezhnev.
Lorne Bair Rare Books
In practical terms this means that the Gorbachev team:. It is not an exaggeration to say that in less than seven years the world changed beyond recognition. At the will of the previous rulers the country continued to live the life of a besieged fortress, which excused cruelty and repression inside. Perestroika left Russia in an unprecedentedly favorable international environment. In fact, it had no foreign enemies that might pose a kind of threat that in the past required an all-out effort to ward off. The more seriously minded usually say that under Gorbachev we lost the geopolitical battle and ceded positions in Eastern Europe gained through a victorious war.
Empires do not fall in the blink of an eye. The key question is: Were the methods that maintained the whole postwar order right and proper? Then came the time to cash the check. The reason is simple: very few people in Eastern Europe wanted us to stay. Such reasoning looked quite fair in the light of the experience of all previous wars. But in the nuclear age Soviet security was far less dependent on a buffer zone near its borders.
The geostrategic dogma remained in force for four decades. In shaping our defense policies, we primarily bore in mind nuclear warfare and offensive operations in Europe. We spent a quarter of our gross domestic product for this purpose another quarter was used to subsidize prices. In the meantime, the implementation of either scenario looked increasingly more doubtful. Moreover, we assumed a colossal imperial mission as if the other burdens were not heavy enough.
We made huge investment in the conquered countries in the form of free aid, supplies of raw materials at huge discounts, and spending on infrastructures to accommodate hundreds of thousands of troops. But few Czechs or Poles were grateful to us. Discontent over the existing way of life, largely regarded as a derivative of Soviet dominance, was universal and it erupted many times in dramatic ways. It is not accidental that the East Germans were the first to revolt against a crackdown on small private businesses, collectivization, and fast-tracked development of heavy industries.
Add to this the single-party system and accelerated creation of the armed forces, which devoured a disproportionately large share of the state budget. There were trials and executions, and the eventual emergence of the Berlin Wall in Yet the contradictions remained and were bound to explode sooner or later. I recall a caustic remark popular in those days: even the Germans are unable to make the Soviet system work.
In fact, it was ousted from power in the first free elections. Incidentally, in their own protectorate of Western Europe, the Americans governed life in a way that never required to use force. By the time Gorbachev rose to power, demand for change, long driven deep inside all Warsaw Pact countries, had come close to the boiling point. Sensing blood, the United States and some of its allies stepped up their inciting and propaganda activities. It kept making decisions in favor of generous aid to the Warsaw Pact countries.
In April the Warsaw Pact was extended for another twenty years It would be disbanded in six years later. Active measures were taken in order to involve Eastern European countries in economic cooperation. Regrettably, there were more failures than victories on the economic front.