But there will be no type of experience which accompanies this action in all its instances. This is a line of reasoning which has impressed many readers of the later Wittgenstein see e. At first sight, this doubt about a conscious experience of performing a type of action may seem to be based on a simple survey of the relevant phenomenological facts.
You look and see which conscious experiences accompany the performance of a given type of action. And you find that no type of conscious experience is present in all instances of that action. However, I believe that behind this kind of investigation, it is possible to identify an understanding, which could perhaps be called conceptual, about what conscious experiences are.
When it is inquired by Kripke whether the difference between the performances could consist in a difference in the conscious experiences of the agent, only a limited range of contents of consciousness is examined. It is the contents of bodily sensations, such as having a pain, and of perceptions of secondary qualities, such as seeing red.
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The contents are characterised as "introspectible," "irreducible" "internal impressions" having their own "special quale " pp. There is one as one might think possible content of consciousness which is not considered in this discussion. It is the content the characterisation of which coincides with the characterisation of the performance; i.
The understanding seems to be that this cannot be a content of consciousness proper.
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This understanding, I believe, lies behind the relative unpopularity of the Consciousness Thesis of intentionality of action in philosophy. The understanding is that the content I A is the wrong kind of thing to qualify as a possible content of consciousness. By contrast, whatever it is that we have "in consciousness" when we are in pain, or see something as of red, is the right kind of thing to qualify as a content of consciousness.
If being conscious implies having a conscious experience, and if examples of experiences are exhausted by bodily sensations and perceptions of secondary qualities, then I think it is justified to value theses 1 and 2 asymmetrically. While it is plausible that I must have a type of experience viz. However, it seems that more than this is involved in the resistance in philosophy to Consciousness Thesis 1.
20th WCP: Consciousness and Intentionality of Action
It is commonly understood in philosophy that being conscious of something is equivalent with having a peculiar first-person perspective on oneself. It is possible to detect some such understanding with Kripke, I think. The same understanding seems to be at work with philosophers who deem that insofar as intentionality can be present without experience being present, there is reason to be optimistic about an "objective" or "scientific" or "third-person" account of intentionality see e.
Chalmers, chap. Now, judged from the point of view of this implication, it seems to me less obvious that theses 1 and 2 should be valued asymmetrically.
Whereas other people can know about what I am doing only by being informed about it through any of their five senses, I need not be so informed to know what I am doing. I can know what I am doing not on the basis of such observation. And it may even be that it is necessary for me to so know, in order to do these kinds of things. Unless I know that I am searching for a flower, it is perhaps not clear what ground there is for saying that it is a flower that I search for and not, say, a plant exceeding a certain length; or indeed what ground there is for saying that I am searching for something at all, as opposed to walking about absent-mindedly.
I have suggested that at least two things can be found to be involved in the resistance in philosophy to the Consciousness Thesis 1. The first thing involved in this resistance is an understanding that to be conscious of something is to have a conscious experience , where examples of conscious experiences are exhausted by bodily sensations and perceptions of secondary qualities. The second thing involved is that to be conscious of something is to have a peculiar first-person perspective on oneself.
Leaning on the first understanding, it is possible to reject the thesis 1 with some confidence. Leaning on the second understanding, it is possible to draw a certain conclusion from this rejection, i. I have wished to indicate that we should at least have an open mind about whether it is justified to lean on both these understandings at one and the same time; whether it is justified, that is, to both make the confident rejection of Consciousness Thesis 1 and to conclude from this rejection that one need not have a first-person perspective on oneself when performing an intentional action.
Notes 1 Throughout this paper, terms such as 'he,' and 'himself' are used as abbreviations for 'he or she,' and 'himself or herself. Boghossian, Paul A. Chalmers, David J. Dennett, Daniel C. Dreyfus, Hubert L. Kripke, Saul A. The Consciousness Thesis of intentionality of action Consider an example of intentional action. It can be formulated thus: Consciousness Thesis 1 : A person performs the intentional action A only if the person takes himself to A, or is conscious of A-ing.
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Edmund Husserl: Intentionality and Intentional Content
William Demopoulos. Fred Wilson. Jarrett Leplin. Martin Carrier. Melanie Frappier. Peter Janich. Maria Carla Galavotti. Colin Cheyne. Emily Carson. Home Contact us Help Free delivery worldwide.
Arguments for Intentionalism
Free delivery worldwide. Bestselling Series. Harry Potter. Popular Features. New Releases. Description Philosophy of mind has been one of the most active fields in philosophy for the past three decades. One of the most significant factors in the development of this discipline has been the emergence of cognitive science and the interest philosophers have taken in the empirical study of mind.
Another equally important factor has been the "naturalistic tum" brought about by W. His proposal that normative epistemology be replaced by empirical psychology marked a radical departure from the Fregean "anti- psychologism" and "apriorism" that had characterized much of the analytic tradition in philosophy. But while Quine's program of naturalization called the attention of philosophers to empirical psychology, his conception of psychology was inspired by an austere behaviorism which shunned the mentalism of intentional psychology in the Brentanian and phenomenological tradition.
Thus, while agreeing with Brentano that the "intentional idiom" could not be reduced to that of the natural sciences, Quine argued that it is of a piece with the indeterminacy of translation.